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Everyday Life in Figurational Approach:  
A Meso Level for Sociological Analysis 
Angela Perulli ∗ 
Abstract: »Alltagsleben im figurationalen Ansatz: Eine Meso-Ebene für die so-
ziologische Analyse«. Moving from Elias and Scotson’s “Established and outsid-
ers” the article proposes a discussion about everyday life analytical category. 
This book clearly highlights what can be considered a constant in Elias’ socio-
logical methodology: the necessity for sociology to depart as little as possible 
from actual observable reality. Through a typically meso approach to social 
phenomena, the small things of everyday life, the ways that interactions and 
relations take place in specific places and times, become the observation plan 
to analyse the structural dimensions making society. Gossip, neighbours, free 
time, lifestyle, stigma and solidarity are just some of the topics dealt with in 
this text. With them, everyday life appears as the terrain on which social fig-
urations reveal themselves, reproduce and are visible, in the ongoing game of 
the changing interdependencies of human living. I started by referring to the 
critical position that Elias assumed when invited to express himself on everyday 
life. The second part of the paper deals with the pars construens of Elias’ 
thought: through the category of figuration everyday life as a meso tool to ap-
proach sociological analysis. He sees real individuals at work in it – with their I- 
and we-identities, their habitus – acting and reacting in networks of interde-
pendencies. With the figurational approach, everyday life appears as life that is 
there, as the unique and inevitable dimension of sociological analysis. With the 
peculiar established-outsiders figurational one, everyday life appears as the 
ground to see and study production and reproduction mechanisms of social in-
equalities.  
Keywords: Everyday life, figurations, social inequalities. 
1.  Introduction 
They are many reasons, 50 years on, why it is worth placing renewed attention 
on the research carried out by Elias and Scotson. Not just because it is one of 
the few, or perhaps the only case of field research conducted by N. Elias, or 
because it resulted in the use of conceptual categories and original keys to 
interpretation whose heuristic utility has gained more and more ground (suffice 
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it to think of the many uses of the established and outsider figuration, and the 
concepts of stigma and of group charisma and group disgrace), but also be-
cause it clearly highlights what in my opinion is a constant in Elias’ sociologi-
cal methodology: the necessity for sociology to depart as little as possible from 
actual observable reality. Through a typically meso approach to social phe-
nomena, the small things of everyday life, the ways that interactions and rela-
tions take place in specific places and times, become the observation plan to 
analyse the structural dimensions making society. Gossip, neighbours, free 
time, lifestyle, stigma and solidarity are just some of the topics dealt with in 
this text. With them, everyday life appears as the terrain on which social figura-
tions reveal themselves, reproduce and are visible, in the ongoing game of the 
changing interdependencies of human living. Hence, the author is able to give 
this conceptual category, on which I intend to concentrate my paper, an original 
and in some ways provocative guise.  
In 1978, upon request from the editors of a special issue of a German journal 
on everyday life, Elias deals with the topic of the epistemological status of this 
conceptual category and devotes some pages to reflection on this expression. 
He does so in his usual style – polemical and irreverent towards the sociologi-
cal traditions en vogue at the time – while nevertheless offering the reader no 
few interesting cues and allocating aspects linked to the everyday an absolutely 
central role for the analysis of social phenomena. Elias criticizes a technicist 
use of the term ‘everyday’ as misleading. But despite his initial criticism of the 
sociology of everyday life as a specific discipline, he highlights the cognitive 
and heuristic potentials linked to an approach to social (or human as our author 
would say) phenomena that centres the analysis around real people with their 
relationships, as they are played out in everyday life, ordinary day-to-day life, a 
life that has always had its historical and territorial connotations. Indeed, his is 
an ‘extremist’ position that, if one may say so, overrides the same supporters of 
everyday life sociology, by ultimately upholding that sociology can be no other 
than a science of everyday life, and that the problem does not so much lie in 
separating everyday from non-everyday life, by identifying spheres with distinct 
confines and contents, as calling the attention to what sociology should be as a 
science questioning itself about human formations. Reflection on everyday life 
therefore becomes the opportunity to reflect on sociology, its contents and its 
epistemological status, while once again presenting the most characteristic traits 
of Elias’ approach: societies and social formations as figurations, the pivotal 
nature of the relational elements of human life, the dynamic nature of social 
phenomena and the need for processual keys to understanding them, and the call 
not to reify the concepts and analytical tools. And by so doing Elias offers us 
some suggestions, still usable today, to overcome some of the obstacles that have 
been encountered by the sociology of everyday life over the years. Indeed, they 
offer possible answers to questions that recurrently arise on the heuristic possi-
bilities of approaching sociological topics through the lens of everyday life.  
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2.  Against the ‘Sociology of Everyday Life’ 
It can be useful to start from the pars destruens of Elias’ essay. The first prob-
lem that Elias brings up concerns definition: What is everyday life? The 1978 
essay indeed begins with the consideration that  
Not so long ago, the concept of everyday life could be used in an ordinary, eve-
ryday way. One could talk in all innocence of ‘the way things happen in every-
day life’ without pausing to wonder what ‘everyday life’ might actually mean. 
But now the concept of the everyday has become anything but everyday: it is 
loaded with the freight of the theoretical reflection, and in this form it has be-
come a key concept for a number of schools of contemporary sociology (Elias 
2009a, 127). 
Elias starts by ruling out that there is a field of sociological reflection that can 
be identified as ‘not everyday.’ ‘Everyday life’ is an expression normally used 
in contrast to something that is not everyday life. However, what this some-
thing consists of usually needs to be guessed (Elias 2009a, 128). 
And then:  
As it is used in sociology today, this concept is anything but homogeneous. 
[…] Very rarely is it stated what is really meant by the ‘not-everyday.’ Any 
opponent with whom one is in dispute, and against whom an everyday term is 
used as weapon, remains partly out of reach. Is it possible that even in the 
minds of the various theoreticians of the negative, the common ground denot-
ed by this multifarious concept lies rather in the negative, in what they are 
turning away from, than in the positive meanings they associate with the term? 
(Elias 2009a, 127). 
What unites them would seem to be their common reaction to the theories that 
had long dominated in sociology (structural-functionalist and marxist-oriented 
scholars first of all) which placed attention on the more macro elements of 
social phenomena. So the everyday seemed to rediscover the micro subjective 
spheres of associated human life as a perspective that could place attention on 
the meaning assumed by subjective aspects for the people living them and on 
how individuals experience those traits not solidly institutionalized by society. 
However, by so doing, we have progressively set out along a path that has 
shifted sociological analysis further and further from the reality that can be 
observed in everyday life, while bridling the very term ‘everyday’ into increas-
ingly narrow spheres under the aegis of more and more sophisticated and ab-
stract theoretical constructions.1 
Elias also laments the use by sociologists of philosophical formulations 
(such as that of Husserl) which would lead to “peculiar hybrids – neither phi-
losophy nor sociology” (Elias 2009a, 132) and debates more and more closed 
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within the sociologists’ ‘sect,’ completely incomprehensible to outsiders, pro-
gressively resulting in clear, common-sense (and everyday) expressions taking 
on obscure, ‘difficult’ meanings, unintelligible to the outside.2 With the multi-
plication of the ‘sects’ in contemporary sociology, followed by the failed at-
tempt of the functionalists to affirm a single great universal theory, a multipli-
cation would then be seen of the meanings attributed to the term ‘everyday.’ As 
a result, the term would be used simultaneously with different and at times 
opposing meanings, as emerges from Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Types of Contemporary Concepts of the Everyday with the Implied 
Antithesis: A Selection 
Everyday ↔ Holiday (feast day) 
Everyday = routine ↔ Extraordinary areas of society not subject to routine  
Everyday = working day (especially 
for working class) 
↔ 
Bourgeois sphere – that of people living 
on profits and in luxury, without really 
working 
Everyday = life of the masses ↔ 
Life of the privileged and powerful (kings, 
princes and princesses, presidents, mem-
bers of government, party leaders, mem-
bers of parliament, business leaders) 
Everyday = sphere of mundane events ↔ 
Everything regarded by traditional political 
historiography as the only relevant or 
‘great’ events in history, i.e., the centre-
stage of history 
Everyday = private life (family, love, 
children) 
↔ Public or professional life 
Everyday = sphere of natural, sponta-
neous, unreflecting, genuine experi-
ences and thinking 
↔ 
Sphere of reflective, artificial, unsponta-
neous, especially scientific experience and 
thinking 
Everyday (everyday consciousness) = 
ideological, naive, superficial and 
false experience and thinking 
↔ Correct, genuine, true consciousness 
Source: Elias (2009a, 131). 
 
To look to the everyday as a social datum should be to ask questions such as: 
does the everyday refer to distinguishable spheres or sectors within human socie-
ties? Does such a sphere exist, with its own structure and a certain autonomy? 
But one might consider whether one is not simply referring here, with the aid 
of an esoteric abstraction, to peculiarities of the present working and profes-
sional societies, which could be denoted just as well by terms such as leisure, 
the private sphere and related concepts (Elias 2009a, 133). 
                                                             
2  Here we encounter a topic that was dear to our author, who often brought attention to the 
dangers connected to the reified, far from common-sensical use of the concepts used by 
sociology.  
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Thus far Elias has distanced himself from everyday life sociology as a separate 
sphere of sociological reflection, from that sociology which had seen studying 
everyday life as giving the possibility of erecting disciplinary barriers and, 
‘artificially’ as Elias would say, separating some aspects of social life. Howev-
er, if we go back to a closer meaning of everyday life to the one used in com-
mon language, in which the everyday means the day-to-day, we see that this is 
not just present but central even in Eliasian theory. What is more, it also pre-
sents itself as a possible key to reading the social transformations that have 
guided and affected contemporary society, as well as giving access to those 
very slow transformations that enable Elias to trace the civilizing of modern 
Western societies in a processual light. And he does so by clearing up what he 
defines as a ‘misunderstanding’ (Elias 2009a, 129), that is, what distinguishes 
his use of ‘everyday’ from its ‘technical’ meaning. 
The concept of the everyday as generally used today as a technical sociologi-
cal term, tacitly includes the idea that there are peculiarities of everyday life 
which are different from those of other areas of social life and may even be 
opposed to them. I myself had used my concern with what is classified by oth-
ers as everyday life in precisely the opposite sense, to make clear a change in 
the civilising canon which is indissolubly bound up with other structural 
changes in society, such as the increasing division of functions or processes of 
state formation (Elias 2009a, 129).  
In referring to the ‘everyday,’ as we will see, Elias is speaking of change in the 
personality structure or in the affect-economy. He correlates changes in social 
structure with transformations in the personality structure and claims a central 
role for the aspects that are linked to day-to-day, that is everyday, experience, 
owing to the significance that they have of social transformation in general3. 
Through this correlation, the analysis of everyday life is transferred from a 
truly micro to a meso level: 
There is no good reason to suppose that the investigation of structures of so-
cial life (which, if done one-sidedly, can certainly be called ‘objectivistic’), 
and the investigation of the meanings of the various aspects of social life as 
experienced by the people concerned (which, if done one-sidedly, can very 
well be called ‘subjectivistic’), are incompatible. The investigation of the ex-
periential dimension, the way in which, in the context of their experience of 
social structures, people contribute both to their reproduction and to their 
change, is no less indispensable than the investigation of the long-term, un-
planned, blind interdependence-mechanisms which are at work in the trans-
formation of these structures. This is especially true if one is concerned with 
the process of the transformation of social structures (Elias 2009a, 128). 
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3.  Social Figurations. Or Sociology as the Study of 
Everyday Practices and Acting  
What enables the different dimensions of social living to be kept together, as we 
have seen, is the reading of human societies in terms of a ‘figurational flow.’4 
With this comes the analysis of everyday life, meant as analysis of ordinary 
day-to-day life. It presents itself as the only possible plan for observing the 
networks that link the actors to each other as well as the interdependent actions 
of these same actors. As Elias would remember, figuration is presented as the 
interconnected actions performed by a group comprising individuals who are 
dynamically interdependent on each other, again in a particular historical and 
social situation.  
Villages and towns, universities and factories, status groups and classes, fami-
lies and occupational groups, feudal and industrial societies, communist and 
capitalist states – all these are networks of individuals. Each one of us belongs 
among these individuals – that is what we express in saying ‘my village, my 
university, my class, my country.’ And this is all the more visible, the more we 
remain anchored to the experience of everyday life, day-to-day life, and to the 
use we commonly make of these expressions in it (Elias 2012b, 10). 
The actions are observed as they are actually carried out, as they are actually 
realized. Indeed, real people – and not the Individual in the abstract sense – 
come into play in the figurations (with their biological, cultural, social and 
psychological characteristics, with their life courses and their aspirations) who 
act within more or less formalized rules, which they interpret and help to 
strengthen or change. All individuals pursue their own ends, and as a result 
inevitably act within the boundaries given by the historical, geographical and 
social conditions in which they are born – from the past (individual and group) 
which inevitably accompanies them and the future before them. These confines 
are also represented in the social habitus that links the various individuals in 
the figuration. And it is the set of individual purposes that give rise, in an un-
planned way, to society. Central to determining individual ends is the idea of 
seeking survival, a biological, cultural, social survival of practices and habits. 
And in response to the different needs for survival, historically individuals have 
given rise to distinct figurational forms (families, tribes, states, etc.) which 
Elias calls ‘survival units’ (Kaspersen and Gabriel 2008). With the characteris-
tic of being an ‘attack-and-defence’ unit, they are directly linked to a feeling of 
                                                             
4  Elias speaks first of networks, then of configurations, and subsequently of figurations. At 
the end of his writings, he prefers the expression figurational flow, as clearly emerges from 
the texts selected following a biographical criterion in the work edited by Stephen Mennell 
and Johan Goudsblom (1998). 
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fear that one’s own world, horizon of experience, and survival in the most 
crude and general sense, will disappear (Giovannini and Perulli 2012, 140-3).  
Furthermore, the idea of figuration also centres around the dimension of 
power, in its specific relational definition. The observation of everyday life inevi-
tably has to consider who influences what, as well as what margins and what 
limits people and groups have for acting. Let us take Elias’ example of the foot-
ball match: the figuration is given the moment the actual match is played, by the 
players taking part, by their moods and feelings, by the relationships that arise on 
the pitch, by how the actors interpret their role that day, but also by the field (by 
its conditions), the regulations and how they are interpreted. 
So, like in the match, in every phenomenon of real life, that is, day-to-day 
life, real actors (people) come into play, as do rules, institutions and the envi-
ronment, in more or less visible ways. An example is the description that Elias 
makes of the tumult in a city street:  
Most of the people do not know each other. They have hardly anything to do 
with each other. They push past each other, each pursuing his or her own 
goals and plans. They come and go as it suits them. […] In this tumult of scur-
rying people, for all their individual freedom of movement, there is also a hid-
den order, not directly perceptible to the senses. Each individual person in this 
turmoil belongs in a particular place. He has a table at which he eats, a bed in 
which he sleeps; even the hungry and homeless are both products and parts of 
the hidden order underlying the mêlée. Each of the people who pass has 
somewhere, at some time, a specific function, property or work, a task of 
some kind for others, or a lost function, lost possessions and lost work. There 
are shop assistants and bank clerks, cleaners and society ladies without a pro-
fession of their own; there are men who live on interest, policemen, road-
sweepers, ruined property speculators, pickpockets and girls with no other 
function than the pleasure of men; there are paper wholesalers and fitters, di-
rectors of a large chemicals concern and the unemployed. As a result of his 
function each of these people has or had an income, high or low, from which 
he lives or lived; and as he passes along the street, this function and this in-
come, more openly or more hidden, goes with him. He cannot jump out of it 
as the humour takes him. He cannot simply switch to another function, even if 
he wishes to. […] He is obliged to wear a certain form of dress; he is tied to a 
certain ritual in dealing with others and specific forms of behaviour very dif-
ferent from those of people in a Chinese village or an urban artisans’ commu-
nity in the early Middle Ages. […] Even his freedom to choose among the 
pre-existing functions is fairly limited. It depends largely on the point at which 
he is born and grows up within this human web, the functions and the situation 
of his parents and the schooling he receives accordingly. This too, this past, is 
also directly present in each of the people scurrying in the city bustle. […] 
Each of the people who pass each other as apparently unconnected strangers 
in the street is tied by invisible chains to other people, whether they are chains 
of work and property or instincts and affects (Elias 2010, 18-9). 
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The ‘mobile chains’ that link individuals, whether they be visible or not, al-
ways have a sociological situation and specific physiognomies in time and 
space:  
in each association of human beings this functional context has a very specific 
structure. It is different in a tribe of a cattle-rearing nomads from in a tribe of 
farmers; it is different in a feudal warrior society from in the industrial society 
of our day, and over and above that it is different among the different national 
communities of industrial society itself (Ivi, 19).  
And these diversities can be seen and analysed starting from people’s everyday 
lives, their living habits, their observance of the basic rules upon which social 
relations take shape and develop.  
4.  Some Examples of Processual Sociology  
Figuration therefore appears as an analytical tool that can account for a reality 
inevitably in continual change, overcome the obstacles linked to the habit of 
artificially stopping social phenomena in order to analyse them, then forgetting 
the contrivance committed. The necessarily dynamic nature of the sociological 
approach suggested by Elias is not restricted to the level of the actions and 
interdependencies that take place in a given moment (and can be observed at 
the same time). It underlines the need to always keep the dimension of change 
very much present, the processual nature of actions, relationships and social 
phenomena in general. A processual logic applied to the observation of real 
life, how real people act and interact, among other things enables a close con-
nection to be seen between historical time, biographical time and everyday 
time, between individual biographical horizons and long-term transformations 
in which the same biographies move and in turn produce more general trans-
formations. In long-term analyses too, the plan is still to observe how practices 
and behaviours that can be observed in day-to-day life have changed. These are 
the habits connected to food, physical needs, behaviours in the bedroom, how 
we blow our nose, emotional instincts, the capacity to control ourselves in 
public, together with changes in clothes, housing and political institutions that 
mark the path of this slowest of processes which Elias calls ‘civilizing.’  
Investigations of changes in the canon of behaviour and sensibility in a civilis-
ing direction make possible something that has not been properly attempted up 
to now and has, perhaps, been regarded as not feasible. They allow us to make 
reliable comparisons between the behaviour and feelings of people in different 
phases of a social development. The importance of such investigations into 
changes in what, it seems to me, is currently classified as the ‘everyday’ and 
which I myself attempted to grasp conceptually as a change in the personality 
structure or in the affect-economy, lay precisely in the fact that changes in the 
personality structure could be correlated in this way with changes in the social 
structures as one of its aspects (Elias 2009a, 129-30). 
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These are all elements that are visible at the level of everyday life, as appears 
from the numerous examples that can be found in Elias’ work, some of which he 
explicitly quotes in the 1978 essay: The Civilizing Process (2012a) shows how 
social life is made up of many processes, of figurations positioned in the history 
of the modern West within a wider process or long-term figuration in which the 
chains of human interdependence increasingly differentiate and integrate.  
As is known, for Elias civilizing is that set of social and psychological 
changes that have appeared more and more clearly in the attitudes and behav-
iours of Western men and women from the Middle Ages to date, which are 
particularly visible if we observe the practices and rules underlying them in day-
to-day life. During this long-term process, all the main social functions, the eco-
nomic, political, legal and demographic structures, in the same way as the per-
sonality and psyche structure, change in close interdependence on each other. In 
other words, it shows how the sociogenesis and psychogenesis processes are 
carried out together (Mennell 1992). To this end, certain forms of individual 
psychology (personality structure of the medieval knight and that of the courtier) 
and certain forms of political organization (autonomous feuds and centralized 
state) are compared in different phases of modern European history. For this 
purpose, Elias uses guides to good manners as a source, reading them as indica-
tors of the sensibility and rules of behaviour prescribed to high-ranking youths, 
and hence as indicators of changes in psychology, sensibility and the threshold of 
distaste. From these ‘guides to etiquette’ it clearly emerges how the spontaneity, 
impetuousness and self-indulgence which man wallowed in for centuries had 
been abandoned. We were increasingly orienting ourselves towards exercising 
continual self-control and regulating both our physiological and emotional im-
pulses. The provisions on sensibility and disgust are significant models of behav-
iour precisely because they contrasted a spontaneity that continued to reign in 
human relations carried out far from the courts and had to be abandoned in the 
new social situation that was being created, at court above all, but also in the 
wider world.  
The scenes of everyday life depicted in medieval miniatures and codices 
show a model in which violence over the weak lives alongside idyllic moments 
where sexuality is also satisfied openly, where everything, life and death, sex 
and exercising cruelty can also take place in public. Use of a method of self-
repression does not seem at all necessary; men exhibit their instinctual lives, 
with no concerns about hiding it in any way. Everything changes, albeit slowly, 
when the aristocracy moves into the courts.  
The birth of a court society is seen as the affirmation of a new model of hu-
man interdependence, which is the specific theme of the work The Court Socie-
ty (2006). At the court of Louis XIV that type of interdependence, of mutual 
conditioning between the ministers living there, the king and the noblemen, is 
established in paradigmatic form. And in different, less visible forms this 
would spread in the following centuries to a large part of the population follow-
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ing the great increase in social differentiation. With the court of Versailles, 
ministers and nobility are concentrated in the same physical place, giving rise 
to a small separate world, which is read in terms of figuration. The exercise of 
self-control, foresight, the capacity to interpret the meaning of other people’s 
gestures, and therefore also to exercise personal introspection, to reflect on the 
sense of one’s actions (consciousness) requested by court life, were set to be-
come the habitus for most of the individuals living in the West, in the ‘ad-
vanced’ industrial societies, albeit with a notable difference between the social 
strata. The elements characterizing the court are: the vicinity among its mem-
bers; the monopoly of violence by the sovereign; uniform and moderate self-
control; instinctual self-repression as the trait set to spread with the civilizing 
process. The court marked the passage from an aristocracy of warriors to an 
aristocracy of courtiers. The people at court adopted languages and manners 
that distinguished them from all the other strata, even the privileged. In this text 
we find a wide-ranging study of behaviours and words, with extreme attention 
to their possible multiple meanings. The courtiers developed a highly acute 
sensitivity towards the use of gestures. They could not give in to their likes or 
dislikes because it could be dangerous. All this developed a particular form of 
rationality that presented calculation and foresight as elements common to 
bourgeois rationality but with different contents: the competition for prestige 
among the courtiers; for economic prestige among the bourgeoisie.  
Elias speaks of rationalization because this is a process too. The two types 
of rationality advance the civilizing process since both imply renunciation of 
the ‘pleasure principle’ in favour of the ‘reality principle.’ They require men to 
act increasingly on the basis of self-restriction, in which they personally take it 
upon themselves to tame or silence passions and emotions. In both cases, the 
actor is forced to take a situation of close interdependence into consideration, 
resulting in the renunciation of the immediate satisfaction of needs and desires.  
The French aristocracy, divided between those who remained in the country, 
resigned to becoming poor powerless bumpkins, and those who competed for 
power on the great stage of urban and court life, experienced the harshness of 
the new restrictions, the effort spent every day in the self-control required by 
the new networks of interdependence. They dreamt of a pastoral life which had 
never existed, of simple and uncontaminated nature: these mythical images 
projected the nostalgia for a lost spontaneity, for simple human relations that 
were no longer practised.5 
                                                             
5  I am also referring to the arts, from architecture to painting, and literature (‘aristocratic 
romanticism’). 
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5.  Everyday Life in Established and Outsiders 
The text The Established and the Outsiders (2008) contains another meaningful 
example of Elias’ approach which sees sociology as a science whose main 
source is the observation of real life, i.e. everyday life. In this example one can 
find in a very clear way the eliasian meso approach at work. Through the criti-
cal presentation of Winston Parwa everyday life the social stratification system 
and the mechanisms of production and reproduction of social inequalities 
emerge in all their strength.  
In the final part of The Civilizing Process, Elias had already sketched out a 
series of ideas on relations between social inequalities, power-chances, person-
ality structure and lifestyles. In his reading of the elements that mark the emer-
gence and decadence of the social groups in the position of most power, Elias 
refuses to adopt either the Marxist or the Weberian position, while explicitly 
denying that everything can be traced back to questions of control over the eco-
nomic sources of power. Implicitly, he also refuses to consider class, status and 
party as three factors or dimensions in the distribution of power-chances. What is 
central are the mutual influences of the processes creating meaning and power 
differentials. For Elias, as I said, power is a property figurationally generated by 
all social interdependencies. His study on the small community of Winston Parva 
poses precisely the problem of understanding which mechanisms explain the 
differences in power at community level and, more in general, which sociological 
mechanisms can explain the forms of social differentiation and segregation. What 
allows our author to formulate a bona fide theory of social segregation is his 
gathering of information and testimonies on the everyday life of the inhabitants 
of Winston Parva. The starting point is represented by the fact that  
As soon as one talked to people there, one came up against the fact that the 
residents of one area where the ‘old families’ lived regarded themselves as 
‘better,’ as superior in human terms to those who lived in the neighbouring 
newer part of the community. They refused to have any social contact with 
them apart from that demanded by their occupations; they lumped them all to-
gether as people less well bred. In short, they treated all newcomers as people 
who did not belong, as ‘outsiders.’ These newcomers themselves, after a 
while, seemed to accept with a kind of puzzled resignation that they belonged 
to a group of lesser virtue and respectability, which in terms of their actual 
conduct was found to be justified only in the case of a small minority (Elias 
and Scotson 2008, 2). 
The research was carried out by rebuilding the networks of neighbourhood rela-
tions, by observing who spoke to whom, what activities were performed and with 
whom, whom people went to the cinema with and what they saw, who the groups 
of youngsters were, the love stories that were permitted and the ones that were 
hindered, the local associations and their activities, and the family networks.  
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A significant role was given to studying gossip. It helped define the roles of 
the different actors and gave meaning to their values and behaviour (whether 
real or presumed), even to the point of actual group stigmatization.  
The Village gossip about the Estate […] was based on a set belief about the 
Estate people which acted as a selecting agency: incidents on the Estate which 
did not fit the predetermined belief were of little interest to the Villagers: it 
was hardly thought worth one’s while to feed them into gossip mills. Incidents 
which corresponded to the set image of the Estate were taken up with gusto 
and kept the gossip mills going for a while until they got stale and were re-
placed by fresh gossip items (Elias and Scotson 2008, 122). 
Gossip represents one of the main tools of power unbalance reproduction.  
The analysis of the structure of gossip […] may help towards a clearer idea of 
the dynamics of ranking it shows the extent to which powerful minorities, as a 
kind of gossip leaders, can control the beliefs of a wider network of neigh-
bours, and influence the allotment of gossip rewards and punishments and the 
yardsticks for the ranking of families (Elias and Scotson 2008, 79-80).  
It is in the theoretical chapter included in the second edition of the text (1976) 
that Elias dedicates some interesting pages to reflection on group charisma and 
group disgrace, that is, on those characteristics of approval or disapproval 
resulting from the sole fact of belonging to a particular social group, no matter 
what the individual and real behaviours be. This is also one of the ways used by 
those who are in a position of relative power in relation to others in the group 
to establish and maintain boundaries, to retain and strengthen existing power 
differentials. The study on Winston Parva can be seen as a step towards consid-
ering group charisma group and group disgrace as two poles of a single contin-
uum that reflect the degree of approval/disapproval in the figurational game 
(see Perulli 2014) and we have to note that the analysis has been played at the 
everyday life level.  
Elias stresses:  
Both the ranking order itself and its criteria were known, as a matter of course, 
to everyone who belonged to the group, especially to the ladies. But they were 
known only at the level of social practice or, in other words, at a low level of 
abstraction, not explicity at the relatively high level of abstraction represented 
by terms such as ‘ the social standing of families’ or ‘the internal status order 
of a group’ (Elias and Scotson 2008, 23). 
What made it possible for some individuals, belonging to particular families, to 
have the power to socially segregate other individuals is the length of time they 
had resided in the place, with everything that this involves in terms of social 
relations, habitus, group cohesion and so on. Elias stresses that in the sociolog-
ical sense ‘being old’ refers to social relations with distinct properties that give 
a particular essence to hostility and friendship. They tend to produce a pro-
nounced exclusivity in the way of feeling, and perhaps also in attitude, and a 
preference for people with the same sensibilities, as is underlined by the com-
mon front against outsiders. 
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In everyday life  
the members of the established group were able to communicate their estimate 
of each other’s standing within the internal ranking order of their group in a 
face-to-face encounter directly by their attitudes and, in conversation about 
others not actually present, by little symbolic phrases and the inflection of 
their voice rather than by explicit statements about higher or lower rankings of 
families and persons on their group’s internal ranking and pecking order (Elias 
and Scotson 2008, 23). 
And so doing, they define and defend clear social boundaries.  
6.  The Inevitability of the Everyday 
I started by referring to the critical position that Elias assumed when invited to 
express himself on everyday life. He distances himself from the sociological 
currents that were experiencing a certain amount of success in the 1970s, which 
put the spotlight on the interactions of small groups, private life behaviours, 
studying routines, the subjectivity of social life, etc.. What Elias reprimands 
these sociologists for is not their dealing with not very important, marginal, 
ordinary topics, but that they presented everyday life as a part of life, as if there 
were another type of life, different from the everyday. Also through the topics 
of his research – from good manners to ageing and death; from time to genius, 
to violence; from work to psychosomatic medicine, to art, family relations and 
sport – Elias underlines that social life can only be everyday life and that there-
fore the attention of sociology should be addressed towards this dimension, not 
because it is distinct from or as important as the ‘great’ topics of sociology, but 
because it is the only dimension of real life and real people.  
In Elias’ view, everyday life is the main source for the sociologist. He sees 
real individuals at work in it – with their I- and we-identities, their habitus – 
acting and reacting in networks of interdependencies, helping create those social 
institutions, those norms and values on the basis of which the same actions are 
carried out and which slowly contribute to forming the different societies that 
men have historically (and territorially) formed, with their power differences, 
system of stratification, beliefs, practices, habits, bureaucratic structures, envi-
ronments, horizons of meaning and survival units. Social figuration, as we have 
seen, is the approach that enables all of this to be kept together. With the figura-
tional approach, everyday life appears as reality, as life that is there, as the unique 
and inevitable dimension of sociological analysis. With the peculiar established-
outsiders figurational one, everyday life appears as the ground to see and study 
production and reproduction mechanisms of social inequalities. 
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